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BEYOND EMISSIONS: MIGRATION, PRISONS, AND 
THE GREEN NEW DEAL 
BY 
WYATT G. SASSMAN* AND DANIELLE C. JEFFERIS** 
The Green New Deal is a bold resolution that asks us to 
envision climate policy beyond emissions reductions and pollution 
controls. The proposal seeks to reduce environmental impacts, 
including by dramatically reducing carbon emissions, while 
supporting domestic manufacturing, unionized labor, sustainable 
agriculture, and social equity. The Biden Administration has 
expressed support for the Green New Deal as “a crucial framework 
for meeting the climate challenges we face,” and the proposal has 
influenced the Administration’s early actions to reduce carbon 
emissions. How can the Green New Deal’s framework guide climate 
policy beyond emissions reductions, and who should be a part of this 
conversation? 
Using examples from immigration law and policy, this Article 
envisions what climate policy beyond emissions looks like in two key 
areas: climate migration and immigration detention. Rightfully so, 
the Green New Deal makes several gestures toward the impact its 
proposals would have on immigration policy and migrant 
communities. The Green New Deal identifies that climate change 
will cause—indeed, already has caused—mass migration, labels 
climate change as a national security threat, and recognizes that 
climate change will disproportionately impact migrant 
communities. And it expressly sets out to stop and prevent further 
oppression of migrant communities. As a framework, the Green New 
Deal demands attention to the intersection of climate and 
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immigration policy and meaningful commitment to reforms in the 
areas of immigration law that the Green New Deal impacts.  
We argue that failure to consider the role of immigration reform 
in climate policy risks undermining the Green New Deal’s goal of 
aligning environmental and economic policy with racial, social, and 
economic equality, as well as its specific goals focused on migrant 
communities. To address the impact of climate change on mass 
migration and vulnerable communities, immigration reform should 
be understood as a key element of climate policy guided by the Green 
New Deal. We start that conversation by offering proposals that 
integrate key immigration reforms into a climate policy that looks 
beyond borders and beyond prisons. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The enormous breadth, scope, and threat of global climate change 
blurs the lines between environmental law—traditionally associated 
with pollution control and carbon emissions reductions—and other legal 
fields. A collective realization that environmental law impacts many 
areas of law and policy—and vice versa—is emerging. The Green New 
Deal reflects this reality by seeking to align environmental and climate 
policy with a wide range of progressive social policy goals, such as labor 
protections, racial justice, and greater wealth equality.1 Yet most 
commentary around climate policy and the Green New Deal is only 
beginning to grapple with the breadth of this task.2 Early work has 
focused on the technocratic details of climate policy, such as how to 
achieve the dramatic carbon emission reductions suggested by the 
proposal. Substantially less attention has been devoted to fleshing out 
the difficult and more pressing questions about how to design 
environmental and climate policy that achieves the social justice goals 
set out in the Green New Deal. This Article aims to shine a light on this 
necessary work and move forward the conversation about what 
environmental and climate policy beyond emissions reductions and 
pollution controls looks like. To do so, we link two ongoing debates in 
immigration law with the commitments and goals of the Green New 
Deal to migrant communities: the lack of legal protections for people 
displaced by climate change and the harms of detention-driven 
immigration enforcement.3 Through this discussion, we start the process 
of envisioning climate policy “beyond emissions” to one that also moves 
“beyond borders” and “beyond prisons.”  
To better understand the growing overlap between environmental 
law and immigration law, consider the story of Mr. Ioane Teitiota. On 
September 23, 2015, the government of New Zealand, where Mr. 
Teitiota had lived with his family since 2007, deported him to the island 
nation where he was born.4 Ioane was born “on an islet situated north of 
 
 1 See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing the Green New Deal’s progressive com-
mitments that have otherwise been in conflict with environmental and climate policies). 
 2 See discussion infra Part II.C (noting the need for legal scholarship that envisions 
the implications of the Green New Deal). 
 3 At the outset, we acknowledge that this term “migrant communities” is undefined in 
the Green New Deal resolution and is ambiguous. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 
Res. 59, 116th Cong. (2019). At best—and what we believe to be the drafters’ intent, given 
the spirit of the Resolution—the term includes communities whose members and/or mem-
bers’ relatives have migrated to the United States. We fear, however, that the term could 
conjure the image of an “outsider,” implying that these communities are somehow differ-
ent or “other than” other American communities. We urge legislators and administrators 
to consider defining this term in future policy implementing the Resolution’s goals. See 
discussion infra Part II.A.5 (explaining how the Green New Deal explicitly lists migrant 
communities in its definition of vulnerable groups but does not define the term itself). 
 4 Human Rights Comm., Int’l Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, Views Adopted by 
the Committee Under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 
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Tarawa, a journey of several days away by boat,” in the island Republic 
of Kiribati, roughly 3,000 miles across the Pacific Ocean from New 
Zealand.5 He completed secondary school and worked at a trading 
company until the company closed in the 1990s.6 He then moved to the 
larger island of Tarawa, the capital of Kiribati and married his wife, 
who had also been born on a smaller island in the south of Kiribati.7 
Together, they lived in a traditional village as farmers and fishers.8  
Life was difficult for the Teitiotas. In the late 1990s and early 
2000s, the population of Tarawa swelled as people moved in from the 
smaller surrounding islands.9 Tarawa provided some of the few 
government and medical services in the region, which quickly 
overcrowded.10 Regular flooding on Tarawa disrupted transportation 
and made crops difficult to grow.11 Scarcity and crowding turned living 
on Tarawa from difficult to dangerous as people fought over property 
and resources.12 The Teitiotas wanted to have children.13 They wanted a 
better future and a safe home. They left Kiribati for New Zealand in 
2007.14 They had three children there, and when their residence permits 
expired in 2010, they stayed.15 
In 2012, Mr. Teitiota sought legal help to remain lawfully in New 
Zealand.16 He filed a petition for asylum, claiming that it would be 
dangerous for him and his family to return to Tarawa in light of the 
risks that moving would pose to him and his family.17 Mr. Teitiota’s 
claim was rejected at each stage of New Zealand’s judicial system.18 The 
government concluded that the violence and disruption caused by 
flooding and overcrowding on Tarawa were insufficient to demonstrate 
that Mr. Teitiota was a “refugee” entitled to asylum under relevant 
international law.19 Mr. Teitiota, for example, could not prove that he 
was subjected to threats of violence as a member of a particular social 
group or because of an innate identity characteristic.20 Rather, the risks 
of life on Tarawa were among the many instabilities for which 
 
2728/2016, ¶ 1.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (Oct. 24, 2019) [hereinafter Com-
mittee Views]. 
 5 Id. ¶ 2.5: Distance from Kiribati to New Zealand, DISTANCEFROMTO, 
https://perma.cc/LW86-872G (last visited Nov. 17, 2020).  
 6 Id. ¶ 2.5. 
 7 Id. ¶ 2.6. 
 8 Id. ¶ 2.5. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. ¶¶ 2.4, 2.5. 
 13 Id. ¶¶ 2.5, 4.1.  
 14 Id. ¶¶ 2.5, 4.1. 
 15 Id. ¶ 4.1. 
 16 Id. ¶ 4.2. 
 17 Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 2.2. 
 18 Id. ¶ 2.2. 
 19 Id. ¶ 2.8. 
 20 Id. ¶ 9.7. 
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international law provided no refuge.21 Mr. Teitiota lost his final appeal 
in 2015, and the New Zealand government deported him to Kiribati.22 
His family followed him.23  
In 2007—the same year the Teitiotas immigrated to New Zealand—
the Republic of Kiribati acknowledged in an action plan prepared 
pursuant to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change that the 
sea was swallowing the nation.24 Year by year, sea level rise pushed 
inhabitants of the smaller islands to the larger islands like Tarawa, 
overcrowding the nation’s lands and straining its resources.25 More 
frequent floods salted Tarawa’s fields and stripped parts of the island of 
all vegetation.26 Saltwater spoiled wells on which Tarawa’s inhabitants 
relied.27 Residents built seawalls that demanded constant repair to 
stave off the rising waves.28 There was nowhere else to go. The people of 
Kiribati became vocal advocates, raising awarenss of the impacts of 
climate change on small and developing nations and demanding 
action.29 As the sea claimed their nation and global carbon emissions 
continued to rise, they asked the international community: Where will 
our people go?30 
When New Zealand sent the Teitiotas back to Tawara in 2015, 
seawater washed over the island to knee-deep levels whenever floods 
aligned with high tide.31 The Teitiotas could not grow food in these 
conditions.32 Children on the island were dying from drinking the well 
 
 21 Id. ¶ 2.9. 
 22 Id. ¶¶ 4.3, 4.4. 
 23 Id. ¶ 5. 
 24 KIRIBATI CLIMATE CHANGE STUDY TEAM, REPUBLIC OF KIRIBATI: NATIONAL 
ADAPTATION PROGRAM OF ACTION (NAPA) (Jan. 2007), https://perma.cc/EVH2-6AE8 (Kiri-
bati).  
 25 Committee Views, supra note 4, ¶ 2.5. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. ¶¶ 2.4, 2.5. 
 29 See Anote Tong, While My Island Nation Sinks, Australia is Doing Nothing to Solve 
Climate Change, GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/A5LT-TRB7 (the former pres-
ident of Kiribati calling on Australia to decrease the impacts of climate change by decreas-
ing carbon emissions). 
 30 Id. (“We are being told that we may have to abandon our islands, the places where 
our ancestors have been buried, where our children have a home and an identity. If this 
disastrous outcome comes to pass, my people will need a place of safety to move to.”). No-
tably, some advocates from Kiribati believe that this focus on relocating the people of Kiri-
bati is unnecessary and harmful. See, e.g., Tekau Frere et al., Climate Change and Chal-
lenges to Self-Determination: Case Studies from French Polynesia and the Republic of 
Kiribati, 129 YALE L.J. FORUM 648, 667 (2020) (“Other commentators have claimed that 
countries such as Kiribati have no hope of survival in their current, territorially delimitat-
ed configuration. This approach implies that emigration is the only option for the people of 
Kiribati, though the sensitive subject of climate migration does not sit well with the gov-
ernment and people of Kiribati.”). 
 31 Committee Views, supra note 4, ¶ 2.5. 
 32 Id. ¶ 5. 
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water.33 One of the Teitiotas’ children suffered from blood poisoning, 
causing boils to erupt across the child’s body.34 These were the dangers 
that Mr. Teitiota feared for his family when he requested asylum in 
New Zealand.35 And these are the dangers that New Zealand 
maintained are not within the ambit of its obligation to people 
migrating from other countries, as dictated by international law.36  
Mr. Teitiota then took his claim to the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee, an expert body dedicated to resolving disputes 
regarding the implementation of international human rights treaties.37 
Despite accepting Mr. Teitiota’s “claim that sea level rise is likely to 
render the Republic of Kiribati uninhabitable,” the Committee 
confirmed that New Zealand had no obligation under international law 
to grant Mr. Teitiota and his family the protection of asylum.38 The 
Committee recognized the key gap between climate change and refugee 
law: “For climate change refugees, the risk of serious harm arises from 
environmental factors indirectly caused by humans, rather than from 
violent acts.”39 Because the convention requires this threat of violent 
harm, generally the convention offers no help to people displaced by 
climate change like Mr. Teitiota.40  
The Committee signaled that, “without robust national and 
international efforts, the effects of climate change in receiving states 
may,” nevertheless, “expose individuals to a violation of their rights 
under articles 6 or 7 of the [International] Covenant [on Civil and 
Political Rights], thereby triggering” obligations under international law 
to not deport people back to their country of origin.41 But in Mr. 
Teitiota’s case, the timeframe of Kiribati’s descent into the sea—ten to 
fifteen years—”could allow for intervening acts by the Republic of 
Kiribati, with the assistance of the international community, to take 
affirmative measures to protect and, where necessary, relocate its 
population.”42 Thus, to the extent any obligation under international law 
could exist, it did not exist under Mr. Teitiota’s circumstances.  
 
 33 See id. ¶ 2.6 (“She had heard stories of children getting diarrhea and even dying be-
cause of the poor quality of drinking water”).  
 34 Id. ¶ 5. 
 35 Id. ¶ 3. 
 36 Id. ¶ 9.6. 
 37 Id. ¶¶ 1.1–1.2. See also Human Rights Committee, INT’L JUST. RESOURCE CTR., 
https://perma.cc/QF4S-GU24 (last visited Nov. 11, 2020) (describing the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee).  
 38 Id. ¶ 9.12. 
 39 Id. ¶ 7.1. 
 40 See id. ¶ 9.7 (noting the “absence of a situation of general conflict” and that Teitiota 
failed to demonstrate a “real, personal and reasonably foreseeable risk of a threat to his 
right to life as a result of violent acts resulting from . . . private land disputes.”). 
 41 Id. ¶ 9.11. 
 42 Id. ¶ 9.12. Recently, the President of Kiribati has announced plans to adapt Kiribati 
to a changing climate with international help. Christopher Pala, Kiribati’s President’s 
Plans to Raise Islands in Fight Against Sea-Level Rise, GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/2JCY-AFFF (“Maamau has rejected migration as a strategy, arguing 
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This story helps demonstrate the chasm between the realities of 
climate change and the law of the many nations, including the United 
States, whose immigration law tracks the contours of international 
law.43 In the coming decades, climate change will displace staggering 
numbers of people both internally and internationally—estimates reach 
into the hundreds of millions—under less direct and less dramatic 
circumstances than those of Mr. Teitiota and his family.44 Both subtle 
changes in climate and environmental degradation, as well as increased 
instances of catastrophes and dangerous events such as hurricanes and 
floods, will displace people for a wide range of reasons, from the failure 
of a season’s harvest, to inhabitable living conditions, to full-scale 
conflict.45 And the risk of displacement, both internally and across 
borders, has been, and continues to be, particularly great for nations in 
the global south and communities of color across the world, making the 
issue also one of racial justice.46 
Mr. Teitiota’s story also illustrates how neither immigration law 
nor environmental law alone can bridge this chasm. The Earth’s climate 
is already changing, and even immediate and dramatic reductions of 
global carbon emissions will not stop changes that are expected to 
displace large numbers of people.47 Likewise, reforms to immigration 
law are only a half-measure, alleviating some of the risk facing climate 
migrants but failing to address either the deep change to communities 
wrought by climate change or the impact to those who migrate within a 
country’s borders.48 A just approach requires matching climate policy 
with immigration policy intended to avoid displacement and lessen the 
risks facing climate migrants, while also accommodating people’s 
climate-change-induced movement and easing the transition of 
 
studies have shown the islands can survive with the right adaptation measures, and say-
ing the people of Kiribati will not be forced to leave.”). 
 43 See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing limits of U.S. immigration law in address-
ing climate migration).  
 44 See discussion infra Part II.A.1 (explaining the four-part structure of the Green New 
Deal resolutions). See also WORLD BANK GROUP, GROUNDSWELL: PREPARING FOR INTERNAL 
CLIMATE MIGRATION 5–6 (2018), https://perma.cc/S5RQ-XRMV (“The cascading impacts 
linked to climate change are already shifting patterns of migration and will increasingly 
do so.”).  
 45 WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 44 (describing the climate trends and their adverse 
effects among different nations).  
 46 See generally INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE, GLOBAL REPORT ON 
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT (May 2016), https://perma.cc/G7G4-VBF2 (estimating and ana-
lyzing displaced populations across the world); Kristin Lambert, The Paris Agreement: 
Spotlight on Climate Migrants, YALE SCH. ENV’T: BLOG (Dec. 29, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/M2GH-WR33 (providing examples of communities of color that face dis-
placement issues). 
 47 Lambert, supra note 46.  
 48 See infra Part III.A (describing climate change’s influences on the movement of peo-
ple). 
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migrating people into new communities.49 Neither alone can bridge the 
gap.50  
This lesson takes on an altogether different character when applied 
to the United States, which implements its immigration policy with a 
massive system of immigration prisons to detain and isolate migrants.51 
This system of detention-driven immigration enforcement has deep and 
lasting impacts, not only on migrant communities, but on communities 
and the nation through environmental and other impacts.52 Nor here 
can a just climate policy ignore the costs and impact this detention-
based approach has on migrant communities and the country.53 
Observers have already begun to draw connections between likely 
climate impacts in Central and South America with increased migration 
to the United States.54 And efforts to “green” America’s prison system 
have led to perverse outcomes.55 Again, neither immigration reform nor 
environmental reform is independently sufficient to address the impacts 
of detention-driven enforcement in a world of climate change.56  
The Green New Deal is the United States’ answer to these kinds of 
complex and difficult overlaps. As a comprehensive vision of climate 
policy, the Green New Deal recognizes the interrelationships between 
climate change and a wide range of structural and systemic injustices.57 
Among these interrelationships is the connection between climate policy 
 
 49 See infra Part III (describing “areas where ongoing collaboration between immigra-
tion and environmental advocates is essential for meaningfully addressing climate migra-
tion”). 
 50 See discussion infra Part III.C (explaining that collaboration between environmental 
and immigration advocates is essential for meaningfully addressing climate migration). 
 51 See discussion infra Part IV (explaining that the United States is now home to the 
largest civil immigration detention system in the world where the government incarcer-
ates nearly 400,000 people annually).  
 52 See discussion infra Part IV.A (explaining the negative health and economic effects 
of confinement on individuals and the broader community).  
 53 See discussion infra Part IV.A (listing the costs of high-rate detention and incarcera-
tion on communities including higher rates of chronic health conditions, and an estimated 
economic burden of $1 trillion).  
 54 See discussion infra Part III.A (explaining that climate change will likely increase 
the migration and displacement of peoples around the world, and that the United States’ 
existing immigration laws are ineffective to deal with the resulting effects); Georgina 
Gustin & Mariana Henninger, Central America’s Choice: Pray for Rain or Migrate: Rav-
aged by Drought, Farmers in Rural Honduras and Guatemala Live on the Edge of Hunger, 
NBC NEWS (Jul. 9 2019), https://perma.cc/ZW44-UCJR. 
 55 See discussion infra Part IV.B (explaining that efforts to “green” prisons may sup-
port and further entrench mass incarceration by diverting attention away from the harms 
of incarceration). 
 56 See discussion infra Part IV.C.2 (explaining that a full realization of the Green New 
Deal’s commitments cannot be achieved without reforming immigration law to eliminate 
the present detention-driven enforcement regime, which will require the intersection of 
climate policy, immigration reform, and social justice). 
 57 See discussion infra Part II.A (explaining that climate change, pollution, and envi-
ronmental destruction have exacerbated a series of systemic injustices, including racial, 
economic, and environmental injustices, by disproportionately impacting frontline and 
vulnerable communities).  
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and the oppression of migrant communities.58 The Green New Deal 
expressly recognizes that climate change will create societal instability 
and large-scale migration of people.59 In recognition of this risk, the 
proposal commits to addressing past, and preventing future, oppression 
of migrant communities.60 As we argue, achieving such a commitment 
requires stepping outside the traditional frameworks of environmental 
law and immigration law.61 It demands the expertise of both 
environmental advocates and immigration advocates to design a climate 
policy that meets the goals of the Green New Deal. Such a climate policy 
must step beyond borders and must envision a world beyond 
immigration prisons.  
These conversations and issues have received remarkably little 
attention in legal scholarship and are only starting to begin elsewhere.62 
Some legal scholarship discussing the Green New Deal is dismissive of 
its social justice goals, instead urging focus on the suite of policy tools 
needed to reduce emissions.63 For example, one article views the social 
policy aspects of the Green New Deal as “laudable objectives” but 
concludes that they are “distinct from reducing [greenhouse gas] 
emissions.”64 There is therefore an open opportunity to begin 
envisioning meaningful legal change meeting the goals of the Green 
New Deal, specifically regarding climate migration.  
This Article begins that conversation. Part II discusses the Green 
New Deal itself, first laying out its structure and content. It then 
discusses the foundation of the modern Green New Deal resolution, 
including context surrounding prior iterations of the “Green New Deal” 
idea, environmentalism’s fraught relationship with many of the values 
pursued in the Green New Deal, and modern economy-scale carbon 
policy. Part II concludes by identifying what we see as the Green New 
Deal’s primary innovation—linking climate policy with social justice 
goals that have historically been in tension with environmentalism—
and noting the resolution’s recent legal and political impacts. Parts III 
and IV draw out the overlaps between the Green New Deal’s 
 
 58 See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (listing the Green New Deal’s goal of promoting jus-
tice by stopping current, preventing future, and repairing historic oppression of migrant 
communities).  
 59 See discussion infra Part II.A (explaining that global warming will lead to mass mi-
gration from the regions most affected by climate change, and that climate change threat-
ens the national security of the United States by destabilizing countries and communities 
around the world).  
 60 See discussion infra Part II.A (stating that a primary goal of the Green New Deal is 
to stop current, prevent future, and repair historic oppression of migrant communities).  
 61 See discussion infra Part III.C (explaining that collaboration between immigration 
and environmental law is essential to meaningfully address climate migration).  
 62 See discussion infra Parts II, III (explaining that legal scholars are only starting to 
work out the implications of the Green New Deal’s intersecting interests).  
 63 See discussion infra Part II.C (noting scholars who are dismissive of the Green New 
Deal’s social justice goals).  
 64 Robert Sussman, Designing the New Green Deal: Where’s the Sweet Spot?, 49 ENV’T 
L. REP. 10428, 10446 (2019).  
 
170 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 51:161 
commitments to migrant communities and two ongoing debates in 
immigration law and policy: the legal status of “environmental refugees” 
and the reliance on detention-driven immigration law enforcement. Both 
Parts conclude with recommendations for envisioning climate policy 
beyond borders and beyond prisons, consistent with the Green New 
Deal’s innovations and commitments.  
We then conclude with some thoughts intended to generalize our 
work in this Article. The Green New Deal calls us to envision climate 
policy beyond emissions reductions and pollution controls. Our 
discussion of the overlaps between the Green New Deal’s commitments 
and two problems in immigration law is intended to be exploratory, not 
complete, and exemplary, not comprehensive. It is intended to inspire 
future conversations with two general takeaways: First, that there is 
important and difficult work for legal scholars to do in fleshing out the 
Green New Deal’s commitment to bridge climate and environmental 
policy with a wide range of social justice issues, particularly its 
commitments to migrant communities. Second, neither climate 
advocates nor social justice advocates should attempt this work alone.  
II. THE GREEN NEW DEAL 
The Green New Deal is a policy proposal aimed at uniting the goals 
of environmental protection, specifically climate change policy, with 
labor protections and other progressive social policy goals.65 The 
proposal is embodied in identical congressional resolutions introduced 
by Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Ed Markey.66 
For our purposes, we will simply refer to them as one resolution. This 
Part walks through the structure, foundation, and innovations of the 
resolution to lay the groundwork for our argument. Specifically, Section 
A outlines the structure and content of the Green New Deal resolution, 
highlighting specific provisions related to immigration issues. Section B 
discusses the foundation of the resolution, including a brief history of 
the “Green New Deal” phrase and an overview of modern economy-scale 
climate policy. Section C outlines the Green New Deal’s primary 
innovations, namely, the scope and scale of carbon reduction policies 
and tying those policies to specific social justice goals.  
 
 65 See generally the House resolution recognizing the duty of the federal government to 
create a Green New Deal, H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019); the Senate resolution recog-
nizing the duty of the federal government to create a Green New Deal, S. Res. 59, 116th 
Cong. (2019); and the joint resolution recognizing the duty of the federal government to 
create a Green New Deal, S.J. Res. 8, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 66 The relevant resolutions are House Resolution 109, H.R. Res. 109, and Senate Reso-
lution 59, S. Res. 59, introduced by Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Sena-
tor Ed Markey on February 7, 2019.  
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A. Structure  
The Green New Deal resolution contains a four-part structure that 
is a helpful way of digesting their content.67 The four parts of this 
structure are: congressional findings, the Green New Deal goals, the 
Green New Deal mobilization, and what we call the Green New Deal 
“principles.”68 
1. Congressional Findings 
The resolution begins with a series of congressional findings that 
can be separated further into four categories.69 The first category of 
findings relates to the risks that climate change presents to the United 
States.70 Relying on the International Panel on Climate Change’s 
“Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 C,”71 the resolutions conclude 
that “human activity is the dominant cause of observed climate change 
over the past century,” that climate change “is causing” a wide variety of 
“extreme weather events that threaten human life, healthy 
communities, and critical infrastructure,” and that “the United States 
has historically been responsible for a disproportionate amount of 
greenhouse gas emissions.”72 The resolution notes that warming above 
two degrees will cause many dramatic, negative outcomes specific to the 
United States, including losses in “annual economic output.”73 The 
resolution explains that warming “must be kept below 1.5 degrees 
Celsius above preindustrialized levels,” which will require global 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions between forty and sixty percent 
from 2010 levels by 2030, and “net-zero global emissions by 2050.”74 The 
resolution asserts that, because of our country’s high technological 
capacity, “the United States must take a leading role in reducing 
emissions through economic transformation.”75 
The second category of findings derive from a wide range of social 
problems in the United States.76 The resolution identifies “several 
related crises” facing the United States, including declining life 
expectancy, “a 4-decade trend of wage stagnation, deindustrialization, 
 
 67 S.J. Res. 8. 116th Cong. (2019). 
 68 Id.  
 69 Id. § 1.  
 70 Id. § 1(1). 
 71 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers: Global 
Warming of 1.5º C: An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5º C 
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and antilabor policies,” and the “greatest income inequality since the 
1920s,” including “a large racial wealth divide” and “gender earnings 
gap.”77 It explains that “climate change, pollution, and environmental 
destruction have exacerbated” a series of “systemic injustices,” including 
racial, economic, and environmental injustices by disproportionately 
impacting “frontline and vulnerable communities.”78 The resolution 
defines “frontline and vulnerable communities” to include “indigenous 
peoples, communities of color, migrant communities, deindustrialized 
communities, depopulated rural communities, the poor, low-income 
workers, women, the elderly, the unhoused, people with disabilities, and 
youth.”79 
Third, the resolution recognizes that “climate change constitutes a 
direct threat to the national security of the United States,” including by 
impacting “stability of countries and communities around the world.”80 
And fourth, the resolution draws a parallel to the New Deal and 
“Federal Government-led mobilizations during World War II,” which 
“created the greatest middle class that the United States has ever seen” 
but “excluded” many frontline and vulnerable communities.81 The 
resolutions therefore identify that a “new national, social, industrial, 
and economic mobilization on a scale not seen since World War II and 
the New Deal era is a historic opportunity” to create jobs, provide 
economic security, and counteract systemic injustice.82 
2. Green New Deal Goals 
Based on these findings, the resolution identifies five goals that it 
defines as the “Green New Deal goals.”83 These goals are:  
 
1)  “achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a fair and just 
transition for all communities and workers;”84  
 
2)  create jobs and economic security for “all people of the United States;”85  
 
3)  invest in sustainable infrastructure;86  
 
 
 77 Id.  
 78 Id. 
 79 Id.  
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. Notably, the Resolution does not differentiate the aim of its goals among citizens 
and non-citizens. See id.  
      86 Id. 
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4)  achieve several environmental goals, including clear air and water, 
climate resiliency, healthy food, access to nature, and a sustainable 
environment;87 and  
 
5)  promote justice “by stopping current, preventing future, and         
repairing historic oppression” of frontline and vulnerable communities.88 
3. Green New Deal Mobilization 
The heart of the resolution is “a 10-year national mobilization” to 
achieve the Green New Deal goals that it defines as the “Green New 
Deal mobilization.”89 This mobilization, in turn, “will require” fourteen 
additional “goals and projects”:90  
 
1)  building resiliency against extreme weather events;91  
 
2)  repairing infrastructure to achieve environmental goals and address 
climate change;92  
 
3)  satisfy 100 percent of power demand in the United States through 
“clean, renewable, and zero-emission energy sources,” including both 
upgrading existing and deploying new renewable energy 
infrastructure;93  
 
4)  focusing on the efficiency of the power grid;94  
 
5)  “achieve maximum energy efficiency” in buildings, including “through 
electrification;”95 
 
6)  reducing emissions of existing manufacturing and encouraging 
“renewable energy manufacturing;”96  
 
7)  “working collaboratively with farmers and ranchers” to reduce 
agricultural emissions and build “a more sustainable food system;”97  
 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id.  
 89 Id.  
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
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8)  “overhauling transportation systems,” with a focus on zero-emission 
vehicles, accessible public transit, and high-speed rail;98  
 
9)   mitigating the effects of climate change, including through 
“community-defined projects;”99  
 
10) removing carbon from the atmosphere “through proven low-tech 
solutions that increase soil carbon storage, such as land preservation 
and afforestation;”100  
 
11) restoring and protecting ecosystems;101  
 
12) cleaning up hazardous waste and abandoned sites for economic and 
sustainable development;102  
 
13) identifying other emission and pollution sources to address them;103  
 
14) promoting international exchange of technology, expertise, funding, 
and services, with the goals of making the United States “the 
international leader on climate action.”104 
4. Green New Deal “Principles” 
The resolution concludes with an additional fifteen “projects and 
goals” required “to achieve the Green New Deal goals and 
mobilization.”105 Although not defined in the resolutions, we label these 
as “principles” to reflect one of the co-sponsor’s description of the 
resolution.106 These principles are:  
 
1)  providing “adequate capital, technical expertise,” and other assistance 
to communities, government entities, or businesses working on the 
Green New Deal mobilization;107  
 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id.  
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 106 H.R. 109: Recognizing the Duty of the Federal Government to Create a Green New 
Deal, CONGRESSWOMAN ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, https://perma.cc/ZLP3-K4MK (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2020) (describing the Green New Deal resolution as consisting of “five 
Green New Deal goals, fourteen mobilization projects, and fifteen guiding principles.”). 
 107 H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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2)  ensuring that the federal government accounts for “the complete 
environmental and social costs” of emissions;108  
 
3)  providing “resources, training, and high-quality education . . . to all 
people of the United States, with a focus on frontline and vulnerable 
communities,” to ensure “full and equal” participation in the Green New 
Deal mobilization;109  
 
4)  public investment in research and development of new clean and 
renewable energy technologies;110  
 
5)  “directing investments” to support communities and industries “that 
may otherwise struggle with the transition away from greenhouse gas 
intensive industries;”111  
 
6)  “ensur[e] the use of democratic and participatory processes” to ensure 
that frontline and vulnerable communities are included in and lead the 
Green New Deal mobilization;112  
 
7)  ensure that the Green New Deal mobilization “creates high-quality 
union jobs;”113  
 
8)  guarantee “a job with a family-sustaining wage” and “adequate family 
and medical” benefits;114  
 
9)  strengthen the “right of all workers to organize, unionize, and 
collectively bargain;”115  
 
10) strengthen the enforcement of labor, workplace safety, 
antidiscrimination, and wage and hour laws;116  
 
11) enact trade rules with “strong labor and environmental 
protections;”117  
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12) ensure public lands, waters, and resources are protected and “that 
eminent domain is not abused;”118  
 
13) obtain “free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples;”119  
 
14) ensure a commercial environment “free from unfair competition;”120 
and  
 
15) provide “all people of the United States” with high-quality health 
care, affordable housing, economic security, and clear water, air, 
affordable food, and access to nature.121 
 
One way of internalizing the content of this four-part structure is to 
conceptualize it in simple terms as the problem (the findings), what 
must be done (the goals and mobilization), and how we will do it (the 
principles).122 This approach helps make sense of the resolution’s 
sometimes confusing terminology, such as its persistent use of the 
phrase “goals and projects” to describe elements of the Green New Deal. 
5. Immigration and the Green New Deal 
The resolution addresses immigration issues both expressly and 
implicitly. Perhaps most importantly, the resolution expressly includes 
migrant communities—though the term itself is undefined—in its 
definition of “frontline and vulnerable communities,” thereby 
incorporating migrant communities into most of the commitments and 
policies of the Green New Deal.123 For example, a primary goal of the 
Green New Deal is to stop current, prevent future, and repair historic 
oppression of these communities.124 Moreover, the resolution guarantees 
that the Green New Deal policies will be developed through 
“transparent and inclusive consultation” with these communities, with 
full awareness of the environmental and social costs imposed on these 
communities, and with many of the resources and opportunities 
presented by the Green New Deal mobilization directed at these 
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 119 Id. 
 120 Id.  
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 122 See generally David Roberts, The Green New Deal, Explained, VOX, 
https://perma.cc/CV6K-TEXZ (last updated Mar. 30, 2019); Lisa Friedman, What is the 
Green New Deal? A Climate Proposal, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/9BZ3-DHRU; Vox, The Green New Deal, Explained, YOUTUBE (June 12, 
2019), https://perma.cc/462S-YQT3 (discussing at 3:50 how American’s will be protected in 
the transition away from fossil fuels).  
 123 H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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communities.125 The Green New Deal therefore represents a 
commitment to meaningfully involve, support, and protect migrant 
communities when developing climate policy.  
The resolution also includes goals beyond U.S. borders that bear on 
immigration.126 The resolutions expressly recognize that global warming 
by about two degrees Celsius “will cause . . . mass migration from the 
regions most affected by climate change,” and that climate change 
threatens the national security of the United States by destabilizing 
countries and communities around the world.127 The resolution also 
envisions the United States taking a leadership role among the 
international community on climate change through investment and 
technology-sharing, which can have important impacts on how other 
nations and their communities adapt to climate change.128 
The resolution also implicates migration issues by directing goals 
and policies towards sectors of the economy where migrant communities 
have traditionally played a large role.129 For example, the resolution 
sets out to reduce emissions in the agricultural sector.130 Likewise, the 
resolution commits to stronger enforcement of workplace safety and 
wage laws, where lax enforcement has substantially endangered 
migrant workers and their communities.131  
Importantly, many of these commitments reflect long-standing 
tensions between, for example, environmental law, labor policy, and 
immigration policy. As the next section explains, it is important to 
understand this context to fully appreciate the Green New Deal’s goals 
and innovations.  
B. Foundations  
While a history of the Green New Deal resolution is well beyond the 
scope of this Article, some context is helpful to understand the proposal. 
The Green New Deal resolution builds on a strong foundation. For 
example, many elements of the Green New Deal Mobilization have long 
been planks of comprehensive climate policy, such as the need to build 
resiliency against extreme weather events and “overhaul” the nation’s 
emissions-heavy transportation system.132 Indeed, the idea of leveraging 
economy-scale climate policy to spur growth and address issues like 
wealth inequality has been associated with the phrase a “Green New 
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 132 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107 (demonstrating that even in the earliest global resolutions on climate 
change, the topics of resilience and the need for greenhouse gas emissions reductions in 
the transportation sector were evident). 
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Deal” for roughly a decade.133 Rather, as Part I.C discusses, the Green 
New Deal’s key innovation stems from the Green New Deal “principles,” 
which recognize a broader entanglement between environmental policy 
and other economic, environmental, and social justice policies.134 Three 
points of context are helpful in getting us to that understanding.  
The first point of context is that the idea of a “Green New Deal” is 
not all that new. The phrase is often attributed to an opinion column 
penned by Thomas Friedman in 2007.135 Friedman’s column 
recommended several policy changes to “green” the world, such as 
ending fossil fuel subsidies, subsidizing renewable energy, and taxing 
carbon dioxide emissions.136 He called such changes a “Green New Deal” 
because they would fundamentally remake the global economy at a scale 
reminiscent of the policy interventions of the 1930’s New Deal.137 In 
2008, a group called the New Economics Foundation developed 
Friedman’s idea into a plan that focused on the United Kingdom but 
reacted to the broader downturn of the global economy in 2008.138 This 
plan, in turn, served as a basis of a “Global Green New Deal” offered by 
the United Nation’s Environment Programme in reaction to the 
“multiple global crises of 2008 – fuel, food, and financial.”139 The U.N.’s 
plan called “on governments to allocate a significant share of stimulus 
funding to green sectors and sets out three objectives: (i) economic 
recovery; (ii) poverty eradication; and (iii) reduced carbon emissions and 
ecosystem degradation.”140 These themes are visible in the Green New 
Deal resolution’s findings, goals, and mobilization.141 
 The second point of context is that a basic framework for economy-
scale intervention to reduce carbon emissions has been around for at 
least a decade or so.142 As Friedman’s piece suggests, there is an 
immense—almost shocking—structure of federal subsidies and support 
 
 133 See Julie L. MacArthur et al., Canada’s Green New Deal: Forging the Socio-Political 
Foundations of Climate Resilient Infrastructure?, 65 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 101442, 
101442 (2020) (discussing a brief background of how “Green New Deals” have been used 
over the past decade to restructure infrastructure towards the betterment of the environ-
ment and towards a lessening of inequality). 
 134 H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. § 4 (A)–(O) (2019).  
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for a wide range of carbon-intensive economic activity.143 While many 
focus on federal subsidies for fossil-fuel power generation (and rightly 
so), federal support is crucial to the success of many high-carbon 
elements of the American economy, including industrial agriculture, 
automobile manufacturing, and sprawling land development.144 There 
will be vigorous debate surrounding the proper suite of federal tools to 
engage economy-scale carbon reductions, but the basic idea of changing 
this existing web of federal market-interventions to reduce carbon 
emissions has been, and remains, a basic pillar of a “Green New Deal” 
approach to climate policy.145  
Early characterizations of the modern congressional resolution 
sometimes miss this context.146 We are not suggesting that there is 
consensus on what suite of tools to use and how best to use them—there 
is not, and substantial debate on the details of any Green-New-Deal-
style climate policy are to be expected. But any suggestion that there is 
no history or framework for the idea is incorrect. For example, many cite 
President Barack Obama’s 2009 economic-stimulus plan, and in 
particular its focus on subsidizing green industries, as a model for 
certain aspects of federal investment under a Green New Deal.147 There 
is perhaps more clarity than there ever has been on the methods and 
means of deploying renewable energy infrastructure to meet American 
carbon-reduction targets.148 And proponents of national-scale 
interventions to reduce carbon emissions have long recognized the 
opportunity that these interventions present to address social issues 
such as wealth inequality.149  
The third point of context is that environmentalism and many of 
the social justice values embraced by the Green New Deal have 
historically been at odds. For example, the familiar “jobs versus 
environment” tension reflects a break between labor and environmental 
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 147 See Sussman, supra note 64, at 10446 (discussing “The American Recovery and Re-
investment Act of 2009 (ARRA),” or “the Obama stimulus legislation” as a blueprint for 
the Green New Deal).  
 148 See generally JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., ENERGY & ENV’T ECON., INC., PATHWAYS TO 
DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, at xii, xiv (2015) (study concluding that 
“it is technically feasible for the U.S. to reduce GHG emissions 80% below 1990 levels” and 
discussing the technology and infrastructure changes that would accomplish that goal). 
See ENV’T LAW INST., LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: SUMMARY AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (Gerrard & Dernbach eds., 2019) (offer-
ing a “legal playbook” for achieving deep decarbonization). 
 149 See Barbier, supra note 139 (calling for a Global Green New Deal that eradicates 
poverty).  
 
180 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 51:161 
values that stretches from the 1970s, but that was by no means 
inevitable.150 As Jedidiah Purdy has explained, the view that 
environmental policy and labor policy are necessarily at odds with each 
other fails to reflect many overlaps between the two areas, including 
environmentalism’s early origins in workplace health and safety.151  
Tensions between environmentalism and immigration advocacy 
have been high, with environmental values sometimes leveraged to 
exclude and marginalize migrant communities.152 For example, 
influential environmentalist Garrett Hardin famously argued that 
wealthier nations should restrict immigration from less wealthy nations 
to avoid “speeding up the destruction of the environment in rich 
countries.”153 The popularization of Hardin’s image of an ecosystem as a 
“lifeboat” that, if overcrowded, will flood and condemn everyone has 
spurred a legacy of environmentalism that many groups have leveraged 
for decades against fair and just immigration policies in the United 
States.154 As Howard Chang has put it, this “perverse myopia is ironic in 
a movement known for urging us to ‘think globally.’”155 Rather, Chang 
argues, fair immigration policies are likely to lead to better 
environmental outcomes than an “ugly brand of environmentalism” that 
advocates for “immigration restrictions precisely because we expect such 
restriction to keep poor people in the very poverty they want to 
escape.”156  
This context helps illustrate why the primary innovation of the 
Green New Deal is neither its economy-scale approach to climate policy 
nor its intent to leverage that economy-scale policy for the benefit of 
addressing wealth inequality. Rather, the Green New Deal’s true 
innovation is its commitment to aligning climate policy with social 
justice values that have long been positioned at odds with 
environmentalism, including fair and just treatment of migrant 
communities.  
C. Innovations  
The primary innovation of the Green New Deal resolution is not its 
economy-wide approach to addressing carbon emissions and wealth 
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inequality, but its linking of those commitments to progressive social 
policy values that have long been seen as in conflict with environmental 
policy, such as racial justice and unionized labor. For example, many of 
the goals identified in the Green New Deal mobilization have long been 
familiar, if not necessary, elements of an effective carbon-reduction 
policy in the United States, such as focusing on energy efficiency in 
buildings and achieving carbon reductions in agriculture.157 Likewise, 
strategies such as federal subsidies to certain green industries have 
predecessors in President Obama’s stimulus plan and other federal 
economic policies.158 The primary value that the Green New Deal brings 
to the table is its commitment to bridge those strategies and policies 
with social justice goals embodied in the Green New Deal principles.  
This is not to say that the prinicples are the only innovation of the 
Green New Deal. For example, the resolution sets exceptionally 
ambitious targets. Most notably, the resolution envisions a ten-year 
timeline for the Green New Deal mobilization and sets a target for one 
hundred percent of the nation’s energy to be generated by “clean, 
renewable, and zero-emission energy sources.”159 Each target is 
substantially more ambitious than prior policy proposals, including 
carbon-reduction legislation previously introduced in the United 
States.160  
While such targets are dramatic, it is the Green New Deal’s 
commitment to match climate policy with a just transition; antitrust 
enforcement; a living wage; recognizing and addressing environmental, 
racial, and economic justice; protecting indigenous sovereignty; 
prioritizing federal investment in the economy; and taking universalized 
approaches to healthcare, education, and affordable housing that 
presents the opportunity to fundamentally change how we think about 
climate policy. In making such broad commitments, the resolution seeks 
to link environmental protection and climate change policy with 
progressive policies that have otherwise been in tension with 
environmental and climate goals, such as labor protections and racial 
justice. As a result, the resolution offers more than a competing policy 
proposal: it offers a step towards a comprehensive and unifying view of 
progressive domestic policy that reflects the scope and societal scale of 
global climate change.  
Legal scholars are only starting to work out the implications of the 
resolution, and specifically its key innovation of linking these 
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 160 See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (the so-called “Waxman-Markey” bill that would have implemented, among other 
policies, a carbon emissions trading scheme); Amanda Reilly & Kevin Bogardus, 7 Years 
Later, Failed Waxman-Markey Bill Still Makes Waves, E&E NEWS (June 27, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/LKG6-HAWG. 
 
182 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 51:161 
interests.161 Importantly, some scholarship has been dismissive of its 
social justice goals, instead urging focus on the suite of policy tools 
needed to reduce emissions.162 For example, in Robert Sussman’s 
experience-based recommendations for climate policy under a Green 
New Deal, he argues that linking “these broader goals with [greenhouse 
gas] reductions risks creating unrealistically high expectations for 
climate policy and compromising the effectiveness of emission reduction 
strategies by using them to serve a non-climate social and economic 
policy agenda.”163 Sussman concedes that many of the social policy 
aspects of the Green New Deal are “laudable objectives,” but concludes 
that they are “distinct from reducing [greenhouse gas] emissions.”164 
There is, therefore, an important and ongoing role for work envisioning 
what meaningful legal change meeting the justice goals of the Green 
New Deal would look like. Through the next two Parts, we move that 
conversation forward.  
III. CLIMATE MIGRATION  
A. Climate Change and Movement of People 
A wide range of sources confirm climate change’s potential to 
increase migration and displacement of peoples around the world. For 
example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Special 
Report on Global Warming of 1.5 C identified migration, displacement, 
and conflict as potential outcomes of predicted warming.165 Although 
acknowledging that direct connections between environmental effects 
and migration patterns are difficult to draw, the report concluded that 
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temperature changes have meaningful effects on migration for 
agriculture-dependent communities and that warming beyond 1.5 C will 
“increase poverty and disadvantage . . . many populations globally,” 
including making “poor people poorer” and increasing “poverty head 
count” overall.166  
A recent article by Susan F. Martin from Georgetown’s Institute for 
the Study of International Migration provides a helpful overview of how 
people move in relation to environmental pressures.167 Drawing on a 
broader literature, Martin identifies four effects of climate change that 
will likely increase migration of people:  
 
•  Changes in weather patterns that contribute to longer-term drying 
trends that affect access to essential resources such as water and 
negatively affect the sustainability of a variety of environment-related 
livelihoods, 
 
•  Rising sea levels and glacier melt cause massive and repeated flooding 
and render coastal and low-lying areas uninhabitable, 
 
•  Increased frequency and magnitude of weather-related acute natural 
hazards, 
 
•  Competition over natural resources that may exacerbate pressures 
contributing to conflict.168 
 
Estimates of the number of people that will be displaced by these 
effects are shockingly large.169 For example, a survey of literature by 
Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas suggest that “over 200 million people” 
are at risk of being displaced by climate change, although “this number 
is a rough estimate with a large margin of error.”170 The numbers 
revealed in their survey are themselves disorienting in scale; a 1995 
study concluded “that there were already 25 million ‘environmental 
refugees’” and that the number would rise to between 162 and 212 
million people by 2050.171 A later study recognized that this estimate, 
while not “rigorously tested,” nevertheless “remains in line with the 
evidence.”172 The United Nations then warned that 50 million people 
would be displaced by 2010, which was also in line with prior 
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estimates.173 Biermann and Boas’ 2010 study ultimately confirmed that 
over 200 million people will likely be displaced, noting that “would mean 
twenty times more refugees than are at present protected” by 
international law.174 
 There is near universal agreement that the United States’ existing 
immigration laws are ineffective for addressing the migration and 
displacement problems that will result from these effects.175 Those who 
have engaged with the issue have proposed a wide range of reforms, 
primarily focused on amending the refugee and asylum processes to 
accommodate people displaced by environmental change.176 This Part 
will assess those reforms and offer solutions to the climate migration 
problem that resonate with the goals of the Green New Deal. Part III.B 
addresses three proposed changes to domestic U.S. immigration law 
stemming from ongoing debates about how best to address the problems 
climate migration. Part III.C will then offer three directions for bridging 
this debate into the goals of the Green New Deal. 
B. Climate Migration and U.S. Immigration Law 
Several commenters have considered methods for amending or 
otherwise reforming American immigration law to better address the 
problems of climate migration, but by and large, these assessments have 
been pessimistic. Most consider the existing tools of American 
immigration policy to be poorly suited to the scope, scale, and nature of 
climate migration and largely see tweaks to the asylum and refugee 
laws as second-best options to crafting a new visa scheme dedicated to 
people displaced by environmental change. This section discusses three 
proposals in particular: amending the definition of “refugee” to extend 
resettlement and asylum programs to climate migrants, expanding use 
of temporary protected status to climate migrants, and creating a new 
visa system for environmentally displaced people.  
1. Amending the Definition of “Refugee” 
Perhaps the most commonly discussed reform to U.S. immigration 
law in light of the problems raised by climate migration is to expand the 
definition of refugee under the Immigration and Nationality Act177 to 
include environmentally-displaced people, thereby allowing them to 
take advantage of American refugee resettlement programs and to claim 
asylum in the United States.178 Codified into federal law, the definition 
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of “refugee” is drawn from the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and subsequent changes to that convention.179 
Relevant for our purposes here, a person must demonstrate “a well-
founded fear of persecution” in the country of their nationality “on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.”180  
This definition serves as the gatekeeper for access into the United 
States under two methods: resettlement in the United States as a 
refugee and receiving asylum in the United States.181 The resettlement 
program provides a path to permanent status for people outside the 
United States who meet the definition of “refugee.”182 This program is 
administered through an application program and is subject to strict 
quotas.183 Claims to asylum are available to those within the United 
States and to people who present themselves at United States ports-of-
entry.184 A person’s claim to asylum is adjudicated by the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Department of Justice through a complex 
and widely-criticized administrative structure.185 As core elements of 
the American immigration policy directed at people displaced or 
otherwise fleeing the country of their nationality, several have 
considered whether these programs could be directed towards those 
displaced by the effects of climate change.  
There is wide agreement that the existing definition of “refugee” is 
ineffective at addressing the problems of climate migration.186 For 
example, not all climate migrants will necessarily be suffering 
persecution as a member of a protected class included in the 
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definition.187 There are examples of persecution of minority groups 
through discriminatory environmental policies, but these examples are 
largely seen as unrepresentative of the kind of large-scale, generalized 
displacement of people that could occur as a result of climate change.188 
Some have argued that increased political conflict and the 
disproportionate effects of climate change on the poor will expand the 
class of environmentally displaced people that could take advantage of 
the existing definition.189 But most agree that the existing definition’s 
failure to explicitly recognize environmental factors, or protect those 
people who voluntarily migrate, will exclude most climate migrants.190 
 Several commenters have therefore proposed amendments to the 
definition of “refugee” to encompass climate migrants, although the 
contours and content of this proposed addition have been the subject of 
further debate. One primary fault line in these debates is the potential 
difference between an “environmental refugee” and a “climate change 
refugee.”191 Many other debates regarding the appropriate definition 
track the potential differences between these two categories, where the 
environmental refugee is often stereotyped as a person involuntarily 
displaced by a disaster, whereas a climate refugee is stereotyped as 
voluntarily migrating away from slow but dramatic changes in natural 
and economic systems.192 Nevertheless, there is some precedent for such 
an amendment. For example, Sweden and Finland have amended their 
refugee laws to include people displaced because of an “environmental 
disaster.”193  
But others criticize amending the definition of refugee to encompass 
climate refugees. Many of these criticisms stem from the potential scope 
of climate migration. For example, Emily Naser-Hall argues that the 
asylum system should not be leveraged to assist climate migrants 
because the “United States is already overwhelmed with asylum 
applicants under the existing definition” and such an expansion “would 
overwhelm the already overextended asylum system.”194 Elizabeth 
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Keyes offers a similar but distinct concern, noting that “where even the 
relatively narrow existing framework is under intense stress, using the 
word ‘refugee’ to encompass all climate-change migrants feeds the 
dangerous perception that the world can no longer afford the Refugee 
Convention.”195 Other criticisms stem from the poor function of the 
existing system, such as the low quotas for admitting refugees into the 
United States and discretion inherent in the entire system.196 All told, 
many advocates of amending the definition of a “refugee” under 
American law to leverage the resettlement and asylum programs for 
climate migrants propose it as a second-best option. Those advocates 
recognize the significant drawbacks both in the American immigration 
system itself and in extending that system to a potentially large range of 
displaced people under a wider range of circumstances than currently 
contemplated under American law. 
2. Utilizing Temporary Protected Status 
Commenters have also considered utilizing the temporary-
protected-status program to address problems of climate migration. 
“Temporary protected status” generally refers to a program 
administered by the Secretary of the Department for Homeland Security 
that grants people temporary legal status to remain in the United 
States.197 The Secretary can extend this temporary status as long as the 
conditions justifying the status persist.198 Temporary protected status is 
often considered as a potential solution for climate migration because it 
is one of the few immigration policies to expressly recognize 
environmental conditions as the basis for a person’s status within the 
United States.199 Namely, the Secretary may grant temporary protected 
status to people displaced by an environmental disaster.200 For example, 
the Secretary extended temporary protected status to Haitians living in 
the United States after the 2010 earthquake devastated that country.201  
However, most reject temporary protected status as an effective tool 
for accommodating climate migration for two reasons. The first is that 
the program only applies to people in the United States when the 
environmental disaster occurs.202 The policy could not, therefore, 
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address people migrating to the United States from another country as a 
result of environmental change. The second problem is temporary 
protected status’s temporary and discretionary nature.203 The program 
is administered entirely at the discretion of the Secretary, and combined 
with its stop-gap purpose, cannot serve as the basis for a durable 
solution to the long-term problem of climate migration.204 
3. Creating an Environmental Visa Program 
In place of utilizing existing structures in immigration law, several 
commenters have proposed creating an entirely new environmental visa 
program to address climate migration.205 Crafting a new program offers 
obvious benefits, such as allowing countries “to start fresh and tailor 
their new programs to the particular needs of environmental migrants” 
rather than “fit environmental migrants into their current asylum 
systems.”206 Others note that a “visa-type program would be able (at 
least potentially) to grant [environmentally-displaced persons] relief 
without overextending existing asylum structures and flooding the pool 
of refugees needing asylum.”207 Moreover, people could apply for visas 
under such a program from their home states, avoiding the dangerous 
journey to the United States that asylum seekers frequently must 
make.208 Some have suggested that such visas be linked to other 
international climate change policies,209 such as emissions obligations so 
that the “highest emitters” will “provide the most visas” for those 
displaced by environmental change.210 
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But standing up a new scheme rather than repurposing an old one 
comes with obvious costs. For example, at least one proponent has called 
for not only a “new legal regime but also international agencies to 
assume the responsibility of dealing with” the task of implementing an 
environmental visa program.211 Likewise, that advocates already link a 
new visa program with broader climate change policies reveals the 
difficulty of isolating specific policy goals amidst a problem with a huge 
variety of causes and inputs. While an environmental visa problem 
offers promise as a potentially effective policy solution, advocates have 
not confronted the wide range of difficulties and problems presented by 
that solution. 
All told, debate exploring reforms to immigration law that remedy 
problems raised by climate migration has offered few solutions. In many 
ways, the debate reflects lessons raised by Ioane Teitiota’s story: that 
immigration law alone cannot address the problems raised by climate 
change.212 Rather, an approach that draws on both environmental law 
and immigration law is necessary to address the sources and impacts—
an approach to climate policy that reaches beyond the borders of the 
United States.  
C. Climate Policy Beyond Borders 
While options for working within existing U.S. immigration law to 
address climate migration are limited, the breadth and scope of the 
Green New Deal present opportunities to broaden that discussion. Such 
opportunities present both risks and benefits well-suited to input from 
immigration advocates. Below are three areas where ongoing 
collaboration between immigration and environmental advocates is 
essential for meaningfully addressing climate migration consistent with 
the goals of the Green New Deal.  
1. Acknowledging Migrant Communities Outside the U.S.  
While the resolution makes commitments to migrant communities, 
the resolution is not clear as to whether those commitments extend to 
migrant communities beyond the borders of the United States. This 
presents a threshold issue for developing climate policy that takes 
migration seriously: advocates must acknowledge that the Green New 
Deal’s commitment to migrant communities extends to communities 
outside of the United States.  
This acknowledgment is a crucial element of ensuring that the 
functions of climate policy reflecting Green New Deal work to benefit 
migrant communities. As we’ve noted, much of the resolution’s benefits 
and guarantees work though its definition of “frontline and vulnerable 
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communities.”213 By incorporating migrant communities into this 
definition, the Green New Deal directs its guarantees, such as 
“transparent and inclusive consultation” regarding many of the 
resources and opportunities presented by the Green New Deal, and 
mobilization at these communities.214  
Migrant communities are often mobile, living lives that connect 
across borders and across communities.215 Visualizing the Green New 
Deal as a solely domestic measure, directed only at those migrant 
communities within the United States, risks severing many of the Green 
New Deal’s commitments and benefits from these communities. This is a 
paramount concern in developing climate policy guided by the Green 
New Deal that necessitates close collaboration between immigration and 
climate advocates, while also offering opportunities to ensure that 
climate policy develops sensitive to the unique nature of migrant 
communities.  
2. Integrating Migration into U.S. Climate Leadership  
There are two important ways that issues raised by ongoing 
debates among immigration scholars can be incorporated into the Green 
New Deal’s commitment to climate leadership: directing investment and 
technology sharing towards adaptation that mitigates the need for 
people to migrate and taking a leadership role in developing 
international standards for internal migration.  
There are potential opportunities for climate policy inspired by the 
Green New Deal to forge closer connections between climate migration, 
adaptation, and international funding mechanisms. For example, 
international climate negotiators have identified migration and support 
for those displaced by climate change as core aspects of climate 
adaptation, and therefore a key goal for international climate policies.216 
A longstanding feature of international climate policy has been a series 
of funds designed for, among other things, supporting adaptation and 
mitigation efforts in developing countries.217 Several commenters and 
the U.N. Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility 
recognized that addressing the problems raised by climate migration 
will likely benefit from, if not require, investment from funds dedicated 
to supporting adaptation to the changing climate.218 
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Biermann and Boas, for example, have recognized the potential 
value that investment in developing countries can provide for 
addressing the problems for climate migration.219 Along these lines, 
Biermann and Boas propose a Climate Refugee and Resettlement Fund 
designed to share the burden of relocating displaced peoples.220 In 
developing the United States’ commitment to climate leadership on the 
global stage, directing investment and technology-sharing towards 
opportunities to mitigate climate migration is an important step 
towards achieving the Green New Deal’s goals.  
A criticism frequently raised in debates regarding climate 
migration is the lack of any domestic or internal structure regarding the 
displacement of people within a country’s borders, often referred to as 
internal migration.221 Some estimates suggest that much climate 
migration will occur within national borders rather than across them.222 
As such, critics argue that the lack of protections for those displaced by 
climate and other environmental factors within their nation’s borders is 
a substantial blind spot in debates.223 The displacement of people and 
communities from New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina presents a 
particularly compelling example of the gaps in federal law regarding 
internal movement of people resulting from environmental change.224 
As Martin notes, international initiatives have sought to fill this 
gap in domestic policies.225 First, the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement are a set of non-binding principles developed by the 
United Nations in 1998.226 Some countries have adopted the Principles 
into their domestic law, and tellingly, the Principles offer a range of 
guarantees that contrast sharply with many of the tragedies faced by 
those displaced after Katrina.227 A more recent development called the 
Nansen Initiative has sought to develop further protections for internal 
migrants with express reference to climate change.228 These initiatives 
may provide a framework for United States leadership in supporting for 
internal migration. As internal migration may reflect a majority of the 
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migration caused by climate change, incorporating this issue into 
international leadership is also a crucial element of achieving the Green 
New Deal’s goals.  
3. Confronting the U.S. Military’s Role 
 Another important area for collaboration is the military’s role in 
addressing climate migration. Some have reacted to evidence that 
climate change will result in increased instability throughout the world 
by drawing a potential role for the military in managing climate 
migration.229 At first blush, the Green New Deal resonates with such 
calls by identifying climate change as a national security issue and 
acknowledging that climate change will result in greater instability.230 
Observers have only begun to investigate the military’s role in climate 
migration, concluding that few restrictions are in place to prevent full-
scale use of the military in reaction to migration induced by climate 
change.231 Such calls raise serious tensions between the Green New 
Deal’s view of climate change and migration as a national security issue 
with its commitment to prevent and address oppression of migrant 
communities, particularly in light of the United States’ current reliance 
on detention and prisons to manage its immigration policy. Advocates, 
particularly those with experience in the militarization of civil 
immigration enforcement, must respond to claims regarding the U.S. 
military’s role in addressing climate migration. Such concerns offer a 
regrettable connection to perhaps the defining feature of the United 
States’ current immigration system: its large-scale and institutionalized 
detention of migrants.  
IV. DETENTION-DRIVEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT  
The immigration-enforcement platform of the U.S. government over 
the last four decades has been one characterized increasingly by 
detention, both under the civil legal authority and criminal legal 
authority. Indeed, the government’s reliance on detention to enforce 
migration-related laws has grown to such a degree that the United 
States is now home to the largest civil immigration detention system in 
the world.232 In early 2019, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
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confined nearly 50,000 people per day.233 “[B]y the middle of 2019, the 
figure exceeded 52,000—an apparent all-time high.”234 “Annually, the 
government incarcerates nearly 400,000 people under the same 
authority,”235 a figure that has grown substantially over the last few 
years and one the government was likely to surpass in 2020 until the 
pandemic caused daily detention numbers to dip.236 There is little 
reason to suggest the numbers will not climb again as a vaccine for the 
novel coronavirus becomes available and/or court-ordered monitoring of 
immigration prisons ends. 
The Green New Deal’s emphases on achieving net-zero greenhouse 
gas emissions, creating jobs and economic security for all people in the 
United States, ensuring a fair and just transition to a green society for 
all, and promoting justice for frontline and vulnerable communities 
demand a close examination of the government’s reliance on the 
detention-driven immigration enforcement regime, especially in light of 
the impending issue of climate migration. Research shows that 
incarceration inflicts lasting harms on people and communities, and 
“green” prison initiatives often do little more than perpetuate those 
harms.237 Indeed, working toward the “greening” of prisons is 
contradictory to the aims of the Green New Deal.238 Any legislation 
implementing the Green New Deal must reform U.S. immigration law to 
eliminate the authority for and reliance on detention-driven 
enforcement regimes.  
A. Immigration Detention and the Harms of Confinement 
The federal government’s system of immigration confinement is a 
sweeping, multi-agency affair.239 People are incarcerated for migration-
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related reasons pursuant to both criminal and civil authority.240 As for 
criminal authority, more people are incarcerated on charges of violating 
immigration crimes than any other federal offense.241 On the civil side, 
“multiple components of executive-branch agencies are responsible for 
executing federal civil immigration laws and are statutorily authorized 
. . . to confine people whose lives in some way touch those laws.”242 “Of 
those components, the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for the 
largest numbers of people in immigration confinement.”243  
“ICE’s authority to incarcerate people falls into two distinct 
categories: mandatory detention authority and discretionary detention 
authority.”244 Between these two forms of legal authority, a significant 
proportion of people whose lives intersect in some way with the nation’s 
immigration enforcement system are at risk of detention pursuant to 
civil law. 
Pursuant to its so-called mandatory detention authority,245 the 
government shall take into “custody”246 any noncitizen who the 
government has “reason to believe is removable for almost every crime-
based reason, including crimes involving moral turpitude, controlled 
substance offenses, and aggravated felonies,”247 as well as certain 
classes of “arriving aliens,” including those seeking asylum who have 
not yet passed their credible fear determination.248 This provision 
provides no basis for an immigration judge or other independent arbiter 
to consider bond or otherwise release someone who is detained.249 More 
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than half of the people experiencing immigration confinement pursuant 
to civil law are held pursuant to this sweeping detention authority.250 
The law also obligates the government to confine people who have been 
ordered removed during the period between the entry of the final 
removal order and the actual removal251 and those who the government 
“has reasonable grounds to believe” pose a national security threat.252 
Pursuant to its discretionary civil detention authority, the 
government may arrest anyone it believes is removable from the United 
States and detain the person pending a decision on his or her 
removability.253 Under this authority, an authorized ICE officer may 
release the noncitizen on conditional parole or a bond254 upon a showing 
by the noncitizen that he or she is not a flight risk or a danger to the 
community.255 If ICE denies that initial custody determination, the 
person may seek the immigration court’s review of ICE’s decision.256 The 
immigration court’s bond decision may be appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA).257 The BIA’s bond determination is not 
subject to final review and is, therefore, final.258 
Critically, the above-discussed authority under which the federal 
government may detain people is purportedly civil in nature. That is, 
immigration confinement pursuant to this authority is somehow 
different than punitive incarceration because most259 immigration laws 
are civil, sanctions for violating immigration laws (for example, 
deportation) are considered to be civil,260 and, therefore, detention in 
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furtherance of executing civil immigration laws is civil.261 That said, the 
federal government also confines tens of thousands of people each year 
pursuant to its criminal legal authority for migration-related conduct, 
either in pre-trial custody or after convictions and primarily in prisons 
segregated on the basis of citizenship.262 
Conditions in immigration detention facilities across the country 
are poor, at best.263 In recent years, ICE detainees have succumbed to 
limb amputations, serious illness and infections, and death.264 Indeed, 
ICE has acknowledged publicly at least 185 deaths in its immigration 
prisons between October 2003 and July 2018.265 At least twenty-four 
people have died in the agency’s custody since 2017.266 The American 
Immigration Lawyers Association and the American Immigration 
Council have lodged complaints regarding ICE’s failure to provide 
adequate medical and mental health care in its contract facilities.267 The 
groups’ 2018 complaint submitted to the Department of Homeland 
Security Inspector General recounts a troubling pattern of systemic 
failures to provide safe and secure conditions at the Aurora Detention 
Center in Aurora, Colorado, and immigration prisons across the country, 
particularly with respect to medical and mental health care: 
[The U.S. Constitution, federal law, and detention standards] have failed 
to translate into consistently effective medical and mental health care. 
Instead, records from other detention facilities similar to Aurora reveal a 
general and longstanding pattern of frequent and severe deficiencies in 
care.  
In a June 2014 report, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) studied 
conditions at certain detention centers reserved for noncitizens who have 
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been convicted of a crime. It found ‘numerous reports of medical 
understaffing and delayed care’ and was ‘gravely concerned about the 
ability of some [of these] prisons to provide timely care in urgent 
situations.’ A 2017 study of a wide range of detention facilities found 
health care deficiencies, regardless of whether medical care was supplied 
by private contractors (as at Aurora) or by [ICE Health Service Corps]. The 
same study—basing its conclusions on information in death reviews 
produced by ICE’s Office of Detention Oversight (“ODO”)—found that one-
third of the detainee deaths between 2012 and 2015 were due at least in 
part to substandard medical care.268 
After the government failed to respond, the groups supplemented 
the complaint a year later, noting “the situation for individuals detained 
in the Aurora facility [are] measurably worse.”269 The supplemental 
letter highlighted a 2019 OIG report “documenting ‘egregious’ conditions 
at ICE facilities, including the Aurora facility, in 2018” and discussed 
“[r]ecently leaked DHS documents containing an internal memo bearing 
the subject line, ‘Urgent Matter,’ [and indicating] that the deaths of 
multiple individuals detained in ICE custody were preventable.”270 The 
organizations urged the government “to take immediate action and 
implement meaningful oversight mechanisms to improve medical and 
mental healthcare at the Aurora facility,” noting that “[u]ntil then, 
individuals will continue to needlessly suffer—and perish—in 
immigration detention facilities such as Aurora.”271 
Poor medical and mental health care are not the only conditions for 
concern in immigration prisons. Unsafe and degrading conditions reach 
every aspect of life in detention, including sleep deprivation from lights 
that are kept on twenty-four hours per day, being forced to wear dirty 
clothing that results in infections, being fed food that is rotten,272 and 
being subjected to invasive strip searches and the overuse of solitary 
confinement.273 
The costs of confinement in these sorts of conditions are high, and 
they ripple out from the person who is incarcerated to her family and 
community and beyond. Research shows even brief exposures to solitary 
confinement increases the risk of death in the five years following a 
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person’s release from confinement.274 Confinement, generally, inflicts 
adverse mental and physical health consequences on the people being 
confined.275 And communities whose residents are subject to high rates 
of detention and incarceration face higher rates of chronic health 
conditions.276 The authors of a study published in the American Journal 
of Public Health explained:  
Research on the health consequences of incarceration falls largely into 2 
broad categories. The first, which has received the most empirical 
attention, has focused on individuals directly involved in the criminal 
justice system. Individual incarceration exposure is associated with 
adverse mental and physical health outcomes. A second line of inquiry has 
evaluated the broader health consequences of incarceration—what has 
been variously called the “long arm” of corrections, the collateral 
consequences of mass incarceration, and “spillover” effects related to 
incarceration. For example, female partners of recently released male 
prisoners experience depression and anxiety symptoms, and the children of 
incarcerated parents are at increased risk for behavioral and mental 
health problems. The deleterious health effects of incarceration are not 
merely confined to the family members of incarcerated individuals, 
however. Nonincarcerated individuals living in the communities from 
which inmates are drawn also appear to be at heightened risk for a variety 
of adverse outcomes, including increased crime rates and infectious 
diseases.277 
The costs of confinement are not limited to health costs. The 
economic burden on individuals, families, and communities is 
staggering. Recent estimates place the annual total at $1 trillion, with 
families, children, and community members of those who are 
incarcerated bearing nearly half of the cost.278 
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B. The “Greening” of Prisons 
A news article published in 2012, described a Brazil prison system 
that introduced a program to generate “green” energy.279 The prison 
permitted incarcerated people to ride stationary bikes connected to car 
batteries.280 As the men pedaled, their efforts charged the batteries.281 
The batteries were then used to power streetlights in the local plaza.282 
In exchange for their “green” energy, the government reduced the men’s 
sentences—a one-day reduction for every sixteen hours of pedaling.283 At 
the time the story was reported, “there [were] four bicycles that 
require[d] 10 hours of pedaling to fully charge one battery. The energy 
[was] enough to power 10 street lamps, out of 34 lamps that provide[d] 
light for the plaza.”284 
Efforts to “green” prisons have existed around the world for at least 
a decade, ranging from involving incarcerated people in the production 
of “green” energy for use outside the prison walls to the construction of 
more efficient, “green” prisons.285 An emissions-focused climate platform 
would likely focus (and has focused) on improving the efficiency of 
prisons and detention facilities.286 In 2011, the National Institute of 
Corrections published a guide titled The Greening of Corrections: 
Creating a Sustainable System.287 The report discussed the need to 
improve the efficiency and impact of corrections buildings, operations, 
and programs on the environment in light of “the increase in the prison 
population combined with the rising costs of protecting public safety and 
rehabilitating prisoners,”288 and stated that it “provides correctional 
professionals with a framework to gain a general understanding of 
sustainability practices and principles and to identify examples of 
innovative and practical applications of operations, programs, and 
management strategies for self-sustaining facilities.”289  
The construction of “green” prisons and the implementation of 
environmentally conscious programs for people who are incarcerated 
may be consistent with an emissions-focused climate platform, but the 
focus may conflict with social justice and community-care minded 
policies, such as those the Green New Deal embodies. The “greening” of 
prisons does little to account for the harm incarceration inflicts on 
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people, families, and communities.290 Professors Yvonne Jewkes and 
Dominique Moran explore the idea of the “paradox of the ‘green’ prison” 
in their Theoretical Criminology article, explaining that the emissions-
focused efforts to “green” prisons may, in fact, support and further 
entrench mass incarceration by diverting attention from the harms of 
incarceration or “absorb[ing] or silenc[ing] critiques of the size and scale 
of the prison system itself; as if by reducing prison energy bills, and 
training prisoners to fit solar panels, attention can be deflected from the 
vast carceral monolith which imprisons one in 100 of the US population 
. . . .”291 
C. Climate Policy Beyond Prisons 
A full realization of the Green New Deal’s commitments to 
achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, creating jobs and economic 
security for all people in the United States, and ensuring a fair and just 
transition to a green society for all, as well as the focus on promoting 
justice for frontline and vulnerable communities, will not be possible 
without reform to immigration law to eliminate the present detention-
driven enforcement regime. In light of the Green New Deal’s aims, the 
harms to communities resulting from detention are too significant to 
ignore. The reforms needed to achieve those commitments must, at 
minimum, amend the laws providing for mandatory and discretionary 
civil immigration detention to ensure that the Green New Deal’s goals 
are within all people’s reach and its protections extend to those frontline 
and vulnerable communities who need them the most.  
1. Alternatives to Detention 
The law does not actually mandate detention or require ICE to 
incarcerate anyone pursuant to its civil legal authority.292 Pursuant to 
its mandatory authority, as discussed above, the government shall take 
into custody293 any noncitizen who the government has “reason to 
believe is removable for almost every crime-based reason, including 
crimes involving moral turpitude, controlled substance offenses, and 
aggravated felonies,”294 as well as certain classes of “arriving aliens,” 
including those seeking asylum who have not yet passed their credible 
fear determination.295 And pursuant to its discretionary authority, the 
government may arrest anyone it believes is removable from the United 
States and may detain the person pending a decision on his or her 
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removability.296 One Green New Deal-focused reform to the present 
detention-driven immigration enforcement system may be to turn 
toward non-detention methods of custody297—many of which are 
underutilized298—despite evidence that they are just as effective as 
detention299 and cheaper.300 
Alternatives to detention include releasing a person on her own 
recognizance (used often in the pre-trial, criminal law context),301 
granting a person parole302 or bond,303 imposing conditions of supervised 
released (telephone or in-person check-ins, for example),304 mandating 
the use of electronic monitoring,305 and employing community-based 
alternatives.306 Certainly, employing an alternative to detention—
avoiding the use of incarceration—avoids many of the harms of 
confinement discussed above. These methods allow families and 
communities to stay intact, which is a step toward the Green New Deal’s 
emphasis on promoting justice for frontline and vulnerable 
communities. However, with the exception of releasing a person on her 
own recognizance, each alternative still carries with it traces of 
confinement and its attendant harms.  
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The use of electronic monitoring can restrict a person’s freedom of 
movement in nontrivial ways, for example. While the technology may be 
cheaper, electronic monitoring may be more restrictive, more privacy-
invading, and more harmful to individual dignity than other 
alternatives. Participants become confined to their own homes, forced to 
“plug themselves into the wall” to charge the monitoring devices for 
hours at a time. This can be especially difficult for participants with 
medical conditions, who are pregnant, or who have young children. 
Wearing a monitoring device may also be physically painful and socially 
stigmatizing, which can lead to problems at work or in school.307  
Parole, bond, and supervised release conditions can be particularly 
harmful to people with limited to no financial resources.308 “Immigration 
bonds do not take into consideration an individual’s financial 
circumstances.”309 There is a statutorily mandated minimum of $1,500 
for all civilly imposed immigration bonds, and the median bond amount 
in FY2016 was $8,000.310 Professor Marouf notes, “The people most 
vulnerable to harm in immigration detention are often the ones least 
likely to be able to post a bond. And when people are able to post a bond, 
the financial consequences for the family can be disastrous, resulting in 
the loss of housing or other necessities.”311 Additionally, community-
based alternatives have not been shown to be especially effective in the 
United States despite examples of effective programs in other 
countries.312  
2. Abolishing Detention 
The Green New Deal proposes a radical reimagining of climate 
policy that moves beyond emissions- and energy-focused reform to a 
comprehensive view of the role and intersection of climate policy, 
immigration reform, and social justice.313 Its commitments to achieving 
net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, creating jobs and economic security 
for all people in the United States, ensuring a fair and just transition to 
a green society for all, and promoting justice for frontline and vulnerable 
communities, demand a similarly radical reimagining of the role of 
incarceration in U.S. immigration policy—one where incarceration has 
no role at all. 
A country without immigration detention is not as revolutionary as 
one might think. We need to look only to our not-too-distant history to 
see it. Professor García Hernández recounts compellingly the United 
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States’ near-abolishment of immigration detention in the twentieth 
century: 
Today, immigration imprisonment is the norm, yet in the United States, 
while confinement has long been a central feature of criminal proceedings, 
it has been an anomaly when it comes to immigration-law enforcement. 
For most of the nation’s history, we did not lock up so many people for the 
act of migration. More often than not government agents turned a blind 
eye to migrants who flouted the law, either letting them into the United 
States or sending them back quickly and, in comparison to today, 
painlessly. If they committed a crime, they were expected to serve their 
sentence; afterward, they could return to their communities in the United 
States. In effect, immigration law and criminal law were separate, and 
citizenship played no role in whether people ended up behind bars.314 
And much like the Green New Deal’s reimagining of climate policy, 
abolition “involves reimagining institutions, ideas, and strategies, and 
creating new institutions, ideas, and strategies that will render prisons 
obsolete.”315 Implementing climate policy in a way that advances the 
Green New Deal’s goals of aligning environmental and economic policy 
with racial, social, and economic equality, as well as its specific goals 
focused on migrant communities, will require such a reimagining of the 
method by which the government enforces immigration law. 
V. CONCLUSION: CLIMATE POLICY BEYOND EMISSIONS 
The Green New Deal asks us to envision climate policy beyond 
emissions reductions and pollution controls. Indeed, the Green New 
Deal is the United States’ answer to the kinds of complex and difficult 
overlaps in environmental policy, the world’s response to climate 
change, and nations’ answers to migration that dominate contemporary 
conversations. As a comprehensive vision of climate policy, the Green 
New Deal recognizes the interrelationships between climate change and 
a wide range of systemic injustices. Among these interrelationships is 
the connection between climate policy and the oppression of migrant 
communities. The Green New Deal expressly recognizes that climate 
change will create societal instability and large-scale migration of 
people.316 In recognition of this risk, the proposal commits to addressing 
past, and preventing future, oppression of migrant communities.317 
Achieving such a commitment, however, demands stepping outside the 
traditional frameworks of environmental law and immigration law. It 
demands the expertise of both environmental advocates and 
immigration advocates to design a climate policy that meets the goals of 
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the Green New Deal. Such a climate policy must step beyond borders 
and must envision a world beyond immigration prisons. 
 
